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Abstract
In Bohmian mechanics elementary particles exist objectively, as point particles
moving according to a law determined by a wavefunction. In this context, ques-
tions as to whether the particles of a certain species are real—questions such as,
Do photons exist? Electrons? Or just the quarks?—have a clear meaning. We ex-
plain that, whatever the answer, there is a corresponding Bohm-type theory, and
no experiment can ever decide between these theories. Another question that has
a clear meaning is whether particles are intrinsically distinguishable, i.e., whether
particle world lines have labels indicating the species. We discuss the intriguing
possibility that the answer is no, and particles are points—just points.
PACS number: 03.65.Ta (foundations of quantum mechanics)
Key words: Bohmian mechanics, ontology, empirical equivalence, fundamental
limitations of science, particle trajectories in quantum physics
1 Introduction
We address in this paper rather basic but intimidating questions about the ontology in
Bohmian mechanics and similar theories, using two specific questions as a case study.
What is intimidating about these questions is that they cannot be answered experimen-
tally. However, as we shall explain, this does not mean they cannot be answered. Most,
if not all, of what we point out in this paper has surely been known to some experts.
However, we have found no clear discussion of the matter in the literature.
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Put succinctly, Bohmian mechanics is quantum mechanics with particle trajectories
(e.g., Bohm, 1952a; Bohm, 1952b; Bell, 1966; Du¨rr, Goldstein & Zangh`ı, 1992; Du¨rr,
Goldstein & Zangh`ı, 1996; Goldstein, 2001). It describes the motion of point particles
in physical space R3. In the conventional form of Bohmian mechanics, the law of motion
for the position Qi(t) of the i-th particle of a system of N particles is
dQi
dt
=
~
mi
Im
ψ∗t∇iψt
ψ∗t ψt
(
Q1(t), . . . ,QN(t)
)
(1)
where ψt : R
3N → Cℓ is a wavefunction obeying the Schro¨dinger equation
i~
∂ψt
∂t
= −
N∑
i=1
~2
2mi
∆iψt + V ψt, (2)
mi is the mass of the i-th particle, numerator and denominator in (1) involve scalar
products in the space Cℓ (corresponding to spin, quark color, quark flavor and similar
degrees of freedom), ∆i is the Laplacian with respect to qi (the generic coordinates of
the i-th particle), and finally V is the (possibly Hermitian ℓ×ℓ-matrix-valued) potential
function on R3N . The configuration Q(t) = (Q1(t), . . . ,QN(t)) is random with distribu-
tion |ψt|
2 at every time t if Q(0) is random with distribution |ψ0|
2, as we shall assume
in the following (Bohm, 1952a; Bohm, 1952b; Du¨rr, Goldstein & Zangh`ı, 1992). While
the law of motion of Bohmian mechanics is highly non-Newtonian, Bohmian mechanics
has in common with Newtonian mechanics that there are real particles—with actual
positions—in contrast to most other versions of quantum mechanics.
One of the two questions we want to address in this paper is whether all elementary
species (such as electron, muon, tauon, quark, photon, gluon, etc.) actually have par-
ticles. We have to explain what we mean by this. When we say that certain species
have no particles, we have in mind the following modification of the theory defined by
(1) and (2). Let I ⊂ {1, . . . , N} be a nonempty index set (the set of the labels of all
“real” particles), and stipulate that only #I particles exist, labeled by the elements of
I and moving according to
dQi
dt
=
~
mi
Im
〈ψ,∇iψ〉I c
〈ψ, ψ〉I c
(
Qj(t) : j ∈ I ) (3)
for i ∈ I , where I c = {1, . . . , N} \I , and
〈φ, ψ〉I c (qj : j ∈ I ) :=
∫
R3#I
c
(∏
k∈I c
dqk
)
φ∗(q1, . . . , qN)ψ(q1, . . . , qN) (4)
is the partial scalar product between two wavefunctions φ and ψ, involving the in-
ner product in Cℓ and integration over the coordinates labeled by I c (of all “unreal
particles”), yielding a complex function of the coordinates labeled by I (of the “real
particles”). Equations (3) and (4) are completed by the unchanged Schro¨dinger equation
(2).
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This is a theory of #I particles, even though (2) looks as if it is about N particles.
We could take I to contain all electrons but not the quarks, or instead all quarks but
not the electrons. As we will point out in Section 2, for both of these and many other
choices, no conceivable experiment can detect a difference from conventional Bohmian
mechanics as defined by (1) (or from one another), provided that the universe is in
quantum equilibrium1 (see Du¨rr, Goldstein & Zangh`ı, 1992) so that the configuration
of the (real) particles has probability distribution
ρ = 〈ψ, ψ〉I c . (5)
We will also indicate in Section 2 why (1) may be more plausible than (3). Neverthe-
less, we believe that the impossibility, in quantum equilibrium, of conclusively rejecting
(3) in favor of (1), or (1) in favor of (3), is but another instance of one of the funda-
mental limitations of science: that there may be distinct theories that are empirically
indistinguishable.
The second question we consider in this paper is whether the configuration space
should be, instead of R3N ,
N
R
3 :=
{
S ⊆ R3 : #S = N
}
, (6)
the space of all N -element subsets of R3. NR3 can also be identified with R3N6= modulo
permutations, where
R
3N
6= :=
{
(q1, . . . , qN) ∈ R
3N : qi 6= qj ∀i 6= j
}
(7)
is R3N minus the coincidence configurations. The choice of NR3 as configuration space
corresponds to the notion that a configuration of N particles is a set of N points in
physical space, with the points labeled in no way, neither by numbers 1, . . . , N , nor in
the sense that there could be intrinsically different kinds of points in the world, such as
electron points as distinct from muon points or quark points. (The configuration space
NR3 has nontrivial topology. See Du¨rr, Goldstein, Taylor, Tumulka & Zangh`ı (2005) for
an investigation of the implications of this fact for Bohmian mechanics. This space has
been suggested as the configuration space of N identical particles by Laidlaw & DeWitt
(1971), Leinaas & Myrheim (1977), Nelson (1985), Brown, Sjo¨qvist & Bacciagaluppi
(1999), and Du¨rr, Goldstein, Taylor, Tumulka & Zangh`ı (2005).)
To be specific, we have in mind again a concrete Bohm-type theory, combining the
usual Schro¨dinger equation (2) with a modification of (1). Equation (1) itself does not
define a dynamics for an unordered configuration, from NR3, because different ways of
1In order to appreciate the strength of this indistinguishability, it is important to recognize that
quantum equilibrium is absolute, not in the sense that the universe has to be in quantum equilibrium—
it doesn’t, although the correctness of the quantum mechanical predictions strongly suggests that it
is—but in the sense that a universe in quantum equilibrium, like one in thermodynamic equilibrium,
is pretty much stuck there and nothing we can do, nothing we can control, can get us out of it.
Nonetheless, quantum non-equilibrium versions of these theories would be empirically distinguishable,
from each other and from orthodox quantum theory; this sort of possibility has been explored by
Valentini (2002).
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numbering the N given points would (generically) lead to different trajectories of the
particles. To obtain a well-defined dynamics on NR3, we note that the right hand side
of (1) can be written as
ji
ρ
(
Q1(t), . . . ,QN(t)
)
(8)
with
ji =
~
mi
Imψ∗∇iψ (9)
and
ρ = ψ∗ ψ. (10)
Now symmetrizing j = (j1, . . . , jN) and ρ leads to a new equation of motion
dQi
dt
=
∑
σ∈SN
jσ(i) ◦ σ
∑
σ∈SN
ρ ◦ σ
(
Q1(t), . . . ,QN (t)
)
(11)
where SN is the set of permutations of {1, . . . , N} and
σ(Q1, . . . ,QN) := (Qσ−1(1), . . . ,Qσ−1(N))
so that Qj is moved to the place σ(j). Observe that renumbering the particles now does
not change the trajectories.2
The difference between (1) and (11), which lead to different trajectories and thus de-
fine inequivalent theories, makes clear that in Bohmian mechanics the question whether
particles are just points, represented by an element of NR3, or labeled points, represented
by an element of R3N , has a genuine physical meaning. Again, the question can never
be decided experimentally, as we will explain in Section 3. There we will also say why
this time the conventional formula (1) may be less plausible than its modification.
2 Do Photons Exist? Electrons? Quarks?
A relevant mathematical fact about Bohmian mechanics with a reduced number #I
of particles, as defined by (3), is the equivariance of the probability distribution (5): if
2Let us connect the transition from (1) to (11) with the “problem of recognition” raised by Brown,
Elby, and Weingard (1996, p. 314) in a paper that is largely concerned with whether particle masses
should be attributed to particle locations, or to the wave function, or to both—a question that does not
concern us. Be that as it may, their argument concerning the problem of recognition, as we understand
it, amounts to the observation that the labeled particles in the conventional Bohmian mechanics of
distinguishable particles indeed must be labeled, in the sense of being intrinsically metaphysically dis-
tinct: otherwise which particle corresponds to which argument of the wave function and, consequently,
to which velocity would be ambiguous. We note that it is exactly this ambiguity that renders (1)
inadequate for unordered or unlabeled configurations, and that it is precisely this ambiguitity that is
removed by the symmetrized dynamics (11): with (11) the positions of the particles alone suffice for
deciding which one has which velocity.
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the configuration Q(t) = (Qj(t) : j ∈ I ) is random with distribution ρt = 〈ψt, ψt〉I c at
some time t, then this is so for all times t. This follows from the continuity equation for
ψ∗ψ implicit in the Schro¨dinger equation (2) by integrating over the coordinates qk for
k ∈ I c.
The distribution (5) is the basis of the empirical equivalence with conventional
Bohmian mechanics as defined by (1): Suppose that the result of an experiment is
recorded in the positions Qj of the “real” particles, j ∈ I . Since their distribution is
the same as the marginal distribution of the Qj in conventional Bohmian mechanics,
〈ψt, ψt〉I c(qj : j ∈ I ) =
∫
R3#I
c
( ∏
k∈I c
dqk
) ∣∣ψt(q1, . . . , qN )∣∣2, (12)
there is no way to tell from the values of Qj, j ∈ I , at one particular time whether they
were generated using the reduced dynamics (3) or the conventional one (1). The same is
true of any sequence of experiments, wherein the choice of the second experiment may
even depend on the outcome of the first (Du¨rr, Goldstein & Zangh`ı, 1992). Thus, no
conceivable experiment can decide between the two theories, provided that the outcomes
of any conceivable experiment always get recorded in the Qj , j ∈ I .
3
An example of such a set I would be the set of all quarks. Pointer positions,
ink marks on paper, and even the memory contents in a brain are reflected by the
configuration of quarks. The same is true of electrons: if we know of an atom where its
electrons are, we roughly know where its nucleus would have been if it existed. Even
the positions of all photons alone would presumably suffice for fixing the macroscopic
configuration, as every electron is believed to be surrounded by a cloud of photons,
so that the photon configuration would roughly define the electron configuration (for
quantum states relevant to ordinary macroscopic bodies) well enough to determine the
values of macroscopic variables.4
3And provided that theQj , j ∈ I , always contain, in addition to the outcome, sufficient information
to judge whether the experiment was properly conducted. All of this information would be available if
the Qj , j ∈ I , suffice to define the “macroscopic configuration.”
Aside from this, there is a subtlety here that need not bother us for our considerations but should
be mentioned nevertheless. It does not quite follow from equivariance that the configurations after the
experiment will have the same distribution. This is illustrated by the following example that we owe
to Tim Maudlin (private communication): consider Nelson’s (1985) stochastic mechanics (more pre-
cisely, consider the formulation of stochastic mechanics due to Davidson (1979) for which the diffusion
coefficient is a free parameter) with extremely large diffusion coefficient. Since the wave function of
the universe must presumably be thought of as consisting of several packets that are very far apart
in configuration space R3N , such as packets that correspond to unrealized outcomes of quantum mea-
surements, the configuration Q(t) will very probably also visit—in every second—those distant regions
supporting the other packets, in some of which the dinosaurs have never become extinct. In this case
the conditional distribution for the configuration after the experiment, conditional on that we did be-
gin to perform the experiment, will be drastically different in stochastic mechanics from what it is in
Bohmian mechanics. It is still the case that discrimination will not be possible—we probably will not
even remember that we did that experiment in stochastic mechanics—but not exactly because of the
simple reason that comes to mind at first.
4Here, too, there is a sublety into which we don’t wish to delve in this paper. The point is that
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We encounter here one of the fundamental limitations of science. There is no way
of experimentally testing various possibilities for I against each other. There is no
way of conclusively establishing what the true I is. This situation is probably new for
most physicists;5 most of us are used to contemplating rival theories that make similar
predictions, but not rival theories that make exactly and perfectly the same predictions
for all experiments. But the conclusion is simple: we have no alternative to accepting
that we cannot finally know what I is, and we should simply admit this.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that all possibilities are equally plausible. On the
contrary, many of the possibilities are ridiculous. For example, it is ridiculous to assume
that everything presently outside the solar system is not real, though we (presently
living humans) would not be able to find out (since outcomes of our experiments would
be recorded in the particles inside the solar system). As another example, let I be
a typical set with roughly N/2 elements; what makes this ridiculous is the complete
arbitrariness of what is real and what is not. If we relax the assumption that I is a
fixed set (how this can be done we describe in Appendix A), we find even more drastic
examples: that everything outside the United States is not real (people in the US would
not be able to find out), or that women are not real (men would not be able to find
out), or—as a solipsistic kind of Bohmian theory—that only your brain, dear reader, is
real (you would not be able to find out). Thus, some possibilities would be rejected by
everyone, on basically the same grounds that one would reject solipsism: though it is
logically possible and experimentally irrefutable, it is implausible—or whichever word
you prefer.
It seems quite ridiculous as well, though perhaps not as obviously, to assume that
quarks are not real. A Bohmian world in which quarks are not real would be an eccentric
world, and a God who created such a world would certainly count as malicious. The
only world that seems to us not eccentric at all is the one in which all particles are
real. We mention some reasons: The Schro¨dinger equation (2) suggests that there are
N particles. Why should there be coordinates in the wave function, varying in physical
space, if there is no corresponding particle? On top of that, that all particles are real
seems to be everybody’s intuition, so much so that literally all physics texts talk about
photons, electrons, and quarks, even those maintaining that microscopic reality does
there is a sense in which, arguably, experimental discrimination is trivial in the only-photons version,
because the predictions come out drastically wrong. It’s not simply that pointers don’t end up pointing
with the right distribution; it could be argued that pointers don’t end up pointing at all because
there are no pointers—after all, pointers are not usually considered to be made of photons. Thus the
only-photons theory would then seem to make no decent predictions at all. Of course a proponent
of the only-photons theory wouldn’t be inclined to accept that conclusion: he would, perhaps, appeal
to the information encoded in the pattern of photon positions as the foundation of the predictions of
his theory, using a map from photon configurations to (in fact, non-actual) electron configurations to
results of experiments. For such a person, regardless of whether he is right or wrong in behaving as he
does, experimental discrimination between his theory and a more normal theory would be impossible.
5The situation is in fact not new to researchers in Bohmian mechanics, as Bohmian mechanics is
known to be empirically equivalent to other dynamics on R3N that make the |ψ|2 distribution equivari-
ant, such as Nelson’s (1985) stochastic mechanics and the velocity laws studied by Deotto and Ghirardi
(1998).
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not exist. Another thing to keep in mind is that you may have found it difficult back
in Section 1 to understand the strange thought that some particles are “real” and some
are “not real”; in any case, we found it difficult to explain and even to merely express.
This may indicate that (3) is not a very natural idea.
We finally remark that one could perhaps imagine that there may be compelling
reasons (of a mathematical or physical kind) precluding certain species from having
particles. These would of course be reasons for preferring (3) to (1); presently, however,
we do not know of any such reasons.
3 Are Particles Just Points?
We now turn to a discussion of the symmetrized law of motion (11). The empirical
equivalence between symmetrized Bohmian mechanics, taking place in NR3, and con-
ventional Bohmian mechanics as defined by (1) is again based on equivariance. As is
easily checked, (11) implies equivariance of the distribution
ρsym =
∑
σ∈SN
ρ ◦ σ , (13)
a symmetric distribution on R3N which thus defines a distribution on NR3, which again
equals a marginal of the distribution (10) of the conventional configuration (Q1, . . . ,QN) ∈
R3N , namely the distribution of the set {Q1, . . . ,QN} disregarding the labels. Now em-
pirical equivalence follows, by a reasoning similar to the one following (12), from the
fact that outcomes of all conceivable experiments will be recorded in the unordered
configuration {Q1, . . . ,QN}. To illustrate this fact, we may imagine the outcome as
given by the orientation of a pointer on a scale; as the pointer consists of a huge number
of electrons and quarks, for reading off the orientation of the pointer we need not be
explicitly told which points are the electrons and which are the quarks. Moreover, it is
important to bear in mind that our assessment of which particles are quarks and which
are electrons presumably could not be based on any sort of direct access to the particle’s
intrinsic nature, but rather must be based on information about the particle’s behavior,
reflected in the overall configuration of the particles.
We have two possibilities: particles belonging to different species may be metaphysi-
cally different, i.e., electron points may be different from quark points or photon points,
or, alternatively, they may all be just points. As in the situation of the previous section,
the impossibility of deciding experimentally between these possibilities is a fundamental
limitation of science. A choice can only be based on theoretical considerations, and this
time both possibilities seem plausible enough to be acceptable.
We would like to point out, though, that the possibility that all particles are just
points, first implicitly suggested in Bell’s (1986) seminal paper, is quite attractive, more
attractive than it may appear at first. And not merely because of metaphysical sim-
plicity. As we have already indicated, if, say, electrons and muons were different kinds
of points then this difference in the nature of these points would be in no way directly
accessible to us. Our decision as to whether a given particle is an electron or a muon
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would be based on its behavior under the conditions (such as external fields) we impose,
i.e., based on its trajectory.
We add another thought. Sometimes progress in theoretical physics forces us to
regard what was previously considered two species as two quantum states of the same
species. For instance, proton and neutron appeared as two species, but in fact are two
states of a three-quark system. The most radical development possible in this direction,
considered by Goldstein, Taylor, Tumulka & Zangh`ı (2004), would be that all of what we
presently consider different species are just different states of the same species—which
would of course force us to adopt the symmetrized dynamics (11), and would suggest
against (3).
4 Conclusions
We have made the observation that the following two questions have a clear physi-
cal meaning in Bohmian mechanics, however obscure they may be in other versions of
quantum mechanics: Do all particle species have particles? And, do the particles have
labeled or unlabeled world lines? These questions are about various conceivable equa-
tions of motion that we have explicitly specified. We have underlined that the various
theories are empirically equivalent (provided the set of real particles is not too small),
so that any answer to these questions would have to be grounded in purely theoretical,
possibly philosophical, considerations. We have argued that the most convincing answer
to the first question is that all species have particles, unless this is precluded by com-
pelling mathematical or physical reasons yet to be discovered. Concerning the second
question, we have suggested that the most attractive possibility is that world lines are
unlabeled: what are normally regarded as distinguishable particles are better regarded
as intrinsically indistinguishable.
Bell (1986) expressed concern about the empirical equivalence of various choices of
what is real, in the context of his lattice model analogous to Bohmian mechanics. The
situation may be much better, however, than Bell thought: concerning our question as
to which particles are real, the possibilities differ greatly in plausibility, and one of them
seems clearly more natural than all others—so there is not so much to be concerned
about.
Appendix A
Here is a brief outline of how the dynamics (3) can be modified in order to deal with
a variable set I . One example to have in mind is that, so to speak, I (t) contains all
particles in a particular region R ⊆ R3 of physical space. More generally, we can let I
depend on time and even on the configuration.
To this end, we start with a partition
{
SI : I ⊆ {1, . . . , N}
}
of configuration
space-time R3N × R indexed by all sets of particle labels. Equivalently, we can start
with a configuration-dependent set I (q, t) ⊆ {1, . . . , N} indicating which particles are
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real, specified by a function from configuration space-time R3N × R to the power set
of {1, . . . , N}; the partition is then formed by the level sets of this function. In the
example case in which only the particles in the region R are real, we would set SI =
{(q1, . . . , qN , t) : qj ∈ R, qk /∈ R for j ∈ I , k ∈ I
c}. Since the number of real particles
can change, the dynamics of the configuration takes place in the disjoint union6
Q =
⋃
I⊆{1,...,N}
(R3)
I
.
Let πI : SI → (R
3)
I
× R be the projection πI (q1, . . . , qN , t) = (qj : j ∈ I , t), and
π : R3N×R→ Q×R the combination of the πI , i.e., π(q, t) = πI (q, t) when (q, t) ∈ SI .
The dynamics for Q(t) in Q we now define is the Markovization of the stochastic
process π(Q˜(t), t), where Q˜(t) denotes the conventional Bohmian motion in R3N defined
by (1). Q(t) will consist of deterministic trajectories interrupted by stochastic jumps
that change the number (or labels) of the real particles. See Du¨rr, Goldstein, Tumulka
& Zangh`ı (2004) for the general theory of particle creation in Bohmian mechanics by
means of stochastic jumps. The deterministic motion is defined by
dQi
dt
=
ji(Q(t), t)
ρ(Q(t), t)
, (14)
where, for q ∈ (R3)
I
,
ji(q, t) =
∫
π−1
I
(q,t)
( ∏
k∈I c
dqk
)
~
mi
Imψ∗t∇iψt (15)
is the probability current and
ρ(q, t) =
∫
π−1
I
(q,t)
( ∏
k∈I c
dqk
)
ψ∗tψt (16)
is the probability density on Q. The rate of jumping from Q ∈ Q to a configuration
q′ ∈ Q (in which the particles from I ′ are real) is
σt(dq
′, Q) =
J+(dq′, dQ, dt)
ρ(Q, t) dQdt
, (17)
where x+ = max(x, 0), and J(dq′, dQ, dt) is the probability flow, in R3N ×R, in the time
element dt from SI to SI ′ across the boundary ∂SI at volume elements dq
′ and dQ,
J(dq′, dQ, dt) =
∫
D(dq′,dQ,dt)
dA
(
n0ψ
∗
tψt +
N∑
i=1
~
mi
Imψ∗tni · ∇iψt
)
(18)
6In what follows, (R3)
I
= {(qj : j ∈ I )}, with each qj ∈ R
3, is the set of functions from I to R3.
(R3)
I
is isomorphic to R3#I , but (R3)
I
6= (R3)
I
′
even for #I = #I ′ (unless of course I = I ′).
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with integration domain D(dq′, dQ, dt) = π−1
I
(dQ × dt) ∩ π−1
I ′
(dq′ × dt) ∩ ∂SI ∩ ∂SI ′ ,
dA the surface element on the boundary and (n0,n1, . . . ,nN) the unit normal vector on
the boundary pointing from SI to SI ′ .
By standard arguments (Du¨rr, Goldstein, Tumulka & Zangh`ı, 2004), one shows that
the distribution (16) is equivariant.
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